Midway: WW2's most important battle?

[J.T.B.]

Seventy years ago today, the aircraft carrier Yorktown and the task force under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher entered Pearl Harbor after more than three months of wartime cruising. Yorktown trailed a slick of leaking oil: damage from the Battle of the Coral Sea, where her older cousin Lexington now lay at the bottom. Steaming slowly past the devastated battleship row and its busy salvage crews, she moored near her sisters Enterprise and Hornet, her crew looking forward to a well-deserved rest.

But, as fleet commander-in-chief Admiral Nimitz soon informed Fletcher, that was not to be. The navy's codebreakers had given Nimitz strong reason to believe that a major Japanese fleet was setting out to capture the tiny US outpost on the island of Midway. Nimitz planned to have his carriers in position to intercept that fleet and carry out their ultimate goal: to sink some of the Japanese carrier force which had been so dominant the war up till that time. Enterprise and Hornet under Rear Admiral Spruance would depart for Midway the next day and Yorktown, some repair crew still aboard, would follow two days later. She would not return.

So, to the subject line. I think a case can be made for Midway being the most important battle of WW2. And here's why:

FDR's war leadership was under serious threat at home in 1942, and especially his administration's commitment to the "Germany First" policy. The US had been attacked by Japan, not Germany; sneak-attacked at Pearl Harbor and handed a humiliating defeat in the Philippines. Republicans were campaigning strongly for concentrating the war effort in the Pacific. The US Navy's strong-willed chief, Admiral King, worried that going strictly on the defensive in the Pacific could set back the defeat of Japan by years. And the public desperately wanted to see some sign of victory in that theater.

The victory at Midway allowed the US to go on a limited Pacific offensive, concentrated on Guadalcanal, where, by the time of the 1942 mid-term elections, the US seemed to be holding its own if not winning outright. Even so, Republicans gained significantly in Congress: The Senate went from D-R 66-28 to 58-37, and the House from 267-162 to 222-209.

Loss of the House could have seriously affected FDR's prosecution of the war. Midway gave the administration breathing room to keep its commitments to the war in Europe, which in turn allowed Britain to be persuaded to committing to a cross-channel invasion, which in turn kept Stalin a reasonably satisfied and reliable ally.

Britain rightfully commemorates Trafalgar, and I feel Midway should have a similar revered place in US history. Anyway, please discuss whether you agree with me or not. But for US readers, this Memorial Day, perhaps think of the upcoming 70th anniversary of the battle and the sailors, soldiers, airman and marines who changed history as they defended that tiny speck in the vast ocean.

Justin

 

[Alidar Jarok]

I don't think Midway was the most important battle. Stalingrad was. The fact was, the German-first approach was absolutely the right call.

Simply put, the United States's production dwarfed Japan's.
A good explanation

In other words, even if it had lost catastrophically at the Battle of Midway, the United States Navy still would have broken even with Japan in carriers and naval air power by about September 1943. Nine months later, by the middle of 1944, the U.S. Navy would have enjoyed a nearly two-to-one superiority in carrier aircraft capacity! Not only that, but with her newer, better aircraft designs, the U.S. Navy would have enjoyed not only a substantial numeric, but also a critical qualitative advantage as well, starting in late 1943. All this is not to say that losing the Battle of Midway would not have been a serious blow to American fortunes! For instance, the war would almost certainly have been protracted if the U.S. had been unable to mount some sort of a credible counter-stroke in the Solomons during the latter half of 1942. Without carrier-based air power of some sort there would not have been much hope of doing so, meaning that we would most likely have lost the Solomons. However, the long-term implications are clear: the United States could afford to make good losses that the Japanese simply could not. Furthermore, this comparison does not reflect the fact that the United States actually slowed down it's carrier building program in late 1944, as it became increasingly evident that there was less need for them. Had the U.S. lost at Midway, it seems likely that those additional carriers (3 Midway-class and 6 more Essex-Class CVs, plus the Saipan-class CVLs) would have been brought on line more quickly. In a macro-economic sense, then, the Battle of Midway was really a non-event. There was no need for the U.S. to seek a single, decisive battle which would 'Doom Japan' -- Japan was doomed by it's very decision to make war.

 

[FPAlpha]

I'd say it was one of the most pivotal battles in the Pacific but i can't pinpoint a single battle to be the most important one.. each "legendary" battle like Normandy, Stalingrad, Pearl Harbor, Midway etc contributed hugely to the war but they were "just" stepping stones to the end.

It broke the back of the Japanese Navy at a time where the US needed both a military and psychological win in the war. As with most big battles it could have gone either way with a bit of luck.. had the japanese fleet discovered the US fleet early enough they would have ship and air supremacy and could have dictated the battle and maybe sunk the enemy fleet.

Decisions to refit planes on deck for ground bombing while the enemy fleet was out there was fatal too when american dive bombers discovered the Japanese and hit the deck loaded with planes, bombs and fuel.

On the other hand it may have been doubtful that Japan had long term strategic power to win against the US much less invade US mainland or even Pearl Harbor / Hawai. They simply didn't have the manpower and ressource strength to keep up with the US which is why they acted so aggressively in the Pacific to secure ressources, chief amongst them oil. If Midway had succeeded it would have just prolonged the war past '45 and if Europe was over in '45 the US could have redirected all their power to the Pacific effectively sealing the fate of Japan but at much greater cost in lives.

In that way it was similar to Operation Bagration on the Eastern Front.. Germany was still powerful and had much material on this front but the massive assault by the Soviets broke their back for good and had them on the run ever since up to Berlin. Had Germany held off the offensive it still would have lost because the Soviets outnumbered them well in people and ressources.. it would just have prolonged the fight.

 

[J.T.B.]

I don't think Midway was the most important battle. Stalingrad was. The fact was, the German-first approach was absolutely the right call.

Yes and it's hard to argue against Stalingrad from a purely military standpoint. Midway's claim would be more geo-political. Stalin was making all kinds of noises about negotiating a cease-fire on his own if a front in France wasn't opened up. It may not be likely that he would actually go through with it, but US-UK planning for a ground offensive in Europe depended a great deal upon Stalin's commitment in the East, there could not be a strategic question mark there.

Simply put, the United States's production dwarfed Japan's.
A good explanation [...]

Yes, I've read that before and as far as it goes I agree, the US would have defeated Japan eventually no matter what. But the more time Japan has to consolidate its gains, fortifying islands, building air fields and training air crews makes for more months of grim island fighting and casualties that I hate to think about.

What the piece does not consider are the political implications and repercussions for the war in Europe; it assumes the war effort would proceed along the same channels it did. We tend to think now that the US public was lined up 100% behind the Germany First policy but that was not the case in 1942. A shift in US priorities in landing craft alone toward the Pacific could effect substantial delays on a France invasion timetable.

Also, the idea that there was "no need for the U.S. to seek a single, decisive battle" with the enemy fleet is pretty questionable; it's contrary to naval strategy then or now. Neutralizing the enemy fleet is priority number one and the sooner it can be brought about the better. No maritime power can go completely on the offensive while worrying about when and where an enemy fleet might turn up.

I'd say it was one of the most pivotal battles in the Pacific but i can't pinpoint a single battle to be the most important one.. each "legendary" battle like Normandy, Stalingrad, Pearl Harbor, Midway etc contributed hugely to the war but they were "just" stepping stones to the end.

That's fair, really I just felt like getting some Midway 70th anniversary discussion going, thanks to those who participate!

Justin

 

[MacLeod]

Whilst a case might for the Battle of Midway being the most important battle of WWII could be made for the Pacific theater, I doubt one could be made for the whole of WWII.

On the Western front, a case could be made for the Battle of Britain, which meant Britian remained free and would provide a staging ground that would be use to liberate Western Europe. On the Eastern front maybe Stalingrand, or Kursk.

 

[Alidar Jarok]

I view Midway as the second most important battle in the Pacific front. It was definitely the turning point, but I'd argue that Guadalcanal was more important because it was the first major allied victory and prevented an opening of Australia to attack by Japanese forces (I'm not sure the extent the Japanese ever considered that, though).

Midway was an amazing success and it was one of the cleanest allied victories. The end of the day, there was a clear winner and a clear loser and no ambiguous jungle fighting in islands that marked most of the campaign.

 

[stj]

As I read the OP, it seems that the key value ascribed to Midway was political/strategic, not strictly military. As said, Japan could have won Midway, taken Hawaii, and I think could have "won" Guadalcanal but not been able to sustain an invasion, much less conquest, of Australia. This is not a key military victory.

But the putative political value to Roosevelt was partly domestic and partly diplomatic. There was always opposition to Roosevelt by large segments of the upper classes, and this would by virtue of their class position appear to be significant. But Roosevelt was essentially President for Life, and temporary fluctuations in the "support" from the toothless opposition I think was irrelevant.

As for Stalin making noises about a separate peace, the Allies made noises about another front. The USSR was in the war in a way that put the English and US commitment to shame. This is why the only real noise that could appease Stalin for the English/US failure to implement a second front was to demand German's unconditional surrender. A victory at Midway against the Japanese was also irrelevant to this I think. Besides, wouldn't the only meaningful noises about the prospect of a separate peace in the East be the ones made by Germany? Of which there were none, as I recall.

 

[Captain Ice]

I view Midway as the second most important battle in the Pacific front. It was definitely the turning point, but I'd argue that Guadalcanal was more important because it was the first major allied victory and prevented an opening of Australia to attack by Japanese forces (I'm not sure the extent the Japanese ever considered that, though).

Guadalcanal may have been a more important victory for the allies, but could not/would not have happened without Midway. To me, Midway is the first major allied victory for a couple of reasons:

1. It arrested the advancement of Japanese forces in the Pacific and put them on the defensive for the rest of the war.
2. The US would not have been able to contest Japan's dominance in the Solomons until 1944 or 1945.
3. Japanese control of the Solomon Islands would effectively sever the sea lanes between the US and Australia. Sea lanes that were vital to sustaining the Australian war effort.

Besides, wouldn't the only meaningful noises about the prospect of a separate peace in the East be the ones made by Germany? Of which there were none, as I recall.

No. Stalin did threaten a separate peace with Germany in order to get the US and Briatin to open a second front in order to reduce the amount of German pressure on Soviet forces. A German-Russian peace would have probably meant disaster for Britain since the Germans would then be free to concentrate on them.

 

[J.T.B.]

On the Western front, a case could be made for the Battle of Britain, which meant Britian remained free and would provide a staging ground that would be use to liberate Western Europe. On the Eastern front maybe Stalingrand, or Kursk.

Certainly strong cases for all.

I view Midway as the second most important battle in the Pacific front. It was definitely the turning point, but I'd argue that Guadalcanal was more important because it was the first major allied victory and prevented an opening of Australia to attack by Japanese forces

Good point, Guadalcanal was definitely when the tide turned toward Japan being on the defensive. The Solomons offensive was pretty much wholly due to Admiral King, he alone felt strongly enough and was forceful enough to essentially start the campaign on his own and wait for the president to approve later. He wrote the president in March 1942 that the first US offensive efforts should be a drive north-west from the New Hebrides, but he later wrote that it was not until Midway had stopped Japan's momentum that he felt confident enough to actually proceed. Certainly six IJN fleet carriers operating freely in '42-'43 would have greatly circumscribed the US navy's ability to support any kind of offensive operations. They had to reduce that fleet battle threat.

(I'm not sure the extent the Japanese ever considered that, though).

They very much considered it: Operation MO, thwarted at the Battle of the Coral Sea, was intended to start the conquest of New Guinea, with isolation and eventual invasion of Australia to follow. After that failed there was also an Imperial Army plan for a campaign against Australia.

As I read the OP, it seems that the key value ascribed to Midway was political/strategic, not strictly military. As said, Japan could have won Midway, taken Hawaii, and I think could have "won" Guadalcanal but not been able to sustain an invasion, much less conquest, of Australia. This is not a key military victory.

Japan could probably not have held Midway, much less Hawaii. The "key" significance of the Midway battle was the elimination of the bulk of the Imperial Navy's striking power.

But the putative political value to Roosevelt was partly domestic and partly diplomatic. There was always opposition to Roosevelt by large segments of the upper classes, and this would by virtue of their class position appear to be significant. But Roosevelt was essentially President for Life, and temporary fluctuations in the "support" from the toothless opposition I think was irrelevant.

But Roosevelt did not think it was irrelevant, especially in 1942.

As for Stalin making noises about a separate peace, the Allies made noises about another front. The USSR was in the war in a way that put the English and US commitment to shame. This is why the only real noise that could appease Stalin for the English/US failure to implement a second front was to demand German's unconditional surrender. A victory at Midway against the Japanese was also irrelevant to this I think. Besides, wouldn't the only meaningful noises about the prospect of a separate peace in the East be the ones made by Germany? Of which there were none, as I recall.

Also a good point, but records of Combined Chiefs planning before Tehran show that they took the possibility quite seriously.

Justin

 

[Caliburn24]

Midway is significant of course, but not the most important battle of the war.

I would rank four battles as being easily more significant. Not only because of their importance but also because they could have easily gone in the other direction.

1) Battle of France. France had an enormous and potent military, something forgotten by a lot of us. Had the Germans not performed some wildly brilliant and risky maneuvers France could have stayed in the war for additional months if not years. No Battle of Britain, no Operation Barbarossa, the entire outcome of the war would have changed.

2) Battle of Moscow. If the Nazis had pushed through and won here would the USSR have stayed in the war? Perhaps, but would they have been able to sustain the war effort to recover from such a blow? Less likely.

3) Battle of Dunkirk. Would Britain have fought on if they had lost their entire BEF? Would it have changed the outcome of the Battle of Britain? Would Operation Sea Lion have been given the go ahead? It is impossible to know for sure, but odds are something would have changed.

5) Battle of Normandy. Had those panzer divisions held in reserve deployed immediately the Allies might have been thrown off the continent one more time. And another try at invading mainland Europe would almost certainly have had to wait until 1945. That would have had all sorts of important ramifications.

At Midway the USN put the Japanese on the strategic defensive. Sunk four fleet carriers, and gave FDR a needeed win. But a Japanese win there would not have fundamentally changed anything, especially if the three US carriers had escaped to block any hypothetical move towards Australia.

 

[Roger Wilco]

Going by military implications I do think it's Stalingrad, going by strategic implications I think it's either the Battle of Britain or Normandy, because a defeat of the Allies in either might well have resulted in a Soviet Europe from the Pyrenees to the North Sea.

 

[stj]

I am not privy to the inner thoughts of the dead President Franklin Roosevelt. Interpreting what we can of things he said and did is difficult I think. Pretending to take the opposition seriously is at least a sop to their egoes of opponents. In any event it would be prudent not to gratuitously flaunt an overwhelming superiority.

The bottom line in regards to Roosevelt's political position in 1942 was that, unlike Lincoln, he had already established a position as national leader in the minds of the overwhelming majority in the political strife of the Great Depression. His prestige and popularity was sufficient to cast aside old political prejudices against a third term. Nor were the defeats suffered by the US as costly nor as existentially threatening as those suffered by the Union.

There's no reason to doubt the thinking of the Chiefs' planning staff, unlike the true thinking of a highly skilled politician. But their belief that Stalin really was making a credible threat of a separate peace I daresay reflects their residual anger over the Bolsheviks making a separate peace with Imperial Germany, rather than a competent political judgment about a real possibility.

 

[Roger Wilco]

There was also the little matter of a certain agreement Stalin made with Hitler in 1939...

 

[Alidar Jarok]

Going by military implications I do think it's Stalingrad, going by strategic implications I think it's either the Battle of Britain or Normandy, because a defeat of the Allies in either might well have resulted in a Soviet Europe from the Pyrenees to the North Sea.

I don't think it would have gone that far. Keep in mind that the Soviet Union actually withdrew troops in the post-war settlement. They had all of Austria, but allowed western occupation as well. If Stalin wanted to grab as much territory as possible, he would have refused even to withdraw there.

However, while the Soviet Union's importance in victory has been traditionally downplayed in the west and the more significant battles were fought in the East, I don't think it's right to go to the other extreme and say that the West was unimportant here. It's hard to underestimate the effect of a second front. In fact, two other fronts. The Italian campaign turned into a disaster after Italy surrendered, but it still tied down troops. Likewise, Germany's defense of its western border after Normandy was another boost to Soviet success in their rush to Berlin. Even after Kirsk, Stalin kept asking the allies to open up a western front. Similarly, the Battle of the Bulge was targeted at the western troops because they thought they still had a shot at a one-front war against the Soviet Union and wanted to try and knock out the western advance.

 

[MacLeod]

That agreement with Stalin was worth the same as the bit of paper that had the agreement with Chamberlin on it.

We also had the "Second Battle of El-Alamein" and the occupening 'Operation: Torch' landings in 1942. Where the Western Allies managed to defeat Rommel's Africa corps

 

[stj]

That agreement with Stalin was worth the same as the bit of paper that had the agreement with Chamberlin on it.

Correct.

We also had the "Second Battle of El-Alamein" and the occupening 'Operation: Torch' landings in 1942. Where the Western Allies managed to defeat Rommel's Africa corps

If Rommel had won at el-Alamein, he would have had far too few tanks, artillery and airplanes at the end of too long a logistics line to conquer Egypt. Effectively closing the Suez Canal might not require conquest, I think. But would Rommel have accepted the costs of a tactical defensive?

It seems that all combat in north Africa was essentially diversionary. In the end, the Nazis wasted more than they could replace than the Allies, so I suppose in that sense they "lost." Later, when the supposedly soft underbelly of Europe turned out to be easily defended mountain routes in Italy and the Balkan peninsula, the Nazis "won" the pointless attrition battle.

Yes, Stalin wanted a second front too. Yes, technically he didn't need it, which is fortunate since the Allies did not deliver any significant second front till 1944. If Allied assistance was in any way significant for Soviet victory, it was in a handful of trucks early in the war, when the Nazis were advancing in full spate. But this is not only counterfactual but a very difficult judgment call.

The only way the Allies could have ensured a Nazi victory vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would have been either to allied themselves with the Nazis (as they made noises about in reference to the Finnish war,) or by a separate peace of their own. The USSR would have lost then! Erich von Manstein, in his memoirs, Lost Victories, blamed Hitler for foreclosing a separate peace with the Allies by signing the Non-Aggression Pact. If Manstein was right, then Stalin's genius doomed the Third Reich.

 

[MacLeod]

Came across an interesting action in WWII

The HMS Venturer is the only submarine to intentionally sink another submarine whilst both vessels were submerged.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Venturer_(P68)

 

[Star Wolf]

Came across an interesting action in WWII

The HMS Venturer is the only submarine to intentionally sink another submarine whilst both vessels were submerged.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Venturer_(P68)

No a Japanese submarine in the Bungo Straits did it to half of the Pacific sub fleet in Run Silent, Run Deep.

 

[throwback]

The most important battle for me in World War II was Pearl Harbor. By attacking the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, Japan dragged the US into the war, and forced Germany and Italy into declaring war on the US. This unified the country into fighting a two-front war, in the Pacific and in Europe.

http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_was_American_public_opinion_during_World_War_2

The Russians were helped immensely by cargo ships bearing American goods, and those goods were used by the Russians to help them defeat the Germans at Stalingrad.

Now, imagine what would have happen if Japan didn't attack Pearl Harbor. I think the world would be very different from the one we live in today.

 

[Alidar Jarok]

Lend lease, even to the Soviet Union, started before Pearl Harbor. I don't think we would have stayed out indefinitely, but it's a little harder to say.